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Abstract—The data generated by the devices and existing 
infrastructure in the  Internet of Things  (IoT) should  be 
shared among  applications. However,  data  sharing  in the  IoT  
can  only reach its full potential  when multiple participants 
contribute their data,  for example when people are  able to use 
their  smartphone sensors for this purpose.  We believe that  
each step, from sensing the data to the actionable  knowledge, 
requires trust-enabled mechanisms  to facilitate  data  exchange, 
such as data  perception trust,  trustworthy data  mining,  and  
reasoning with trust  related policies.  The  absence  of  trust   
could  affect  the  acceptance   of sharing  data  in smart  cities. In 
this study, we focus on data  usage transparency and  
accountability and  propose  a trust  model  for data  sharing   
in  smart   cities,  including  system  architecture for trust-based 
data  sharing,  data  semantic  and  abstraction models, and  a  
mechanism  to  enhance  transparency and  accountability for 
data usage. We apply semantic technology and defeasible 
reasoning with  trust  data  usage  policies.  We  built  a  
prototype based  on an air  pollution  monitoring use case and  
utilized  it to evaluate  the performance of our  solution. 
 
Keywords—Internet  of Things,  Smart Cities, Trust-based Data 
Sharing, Data Usage Control, Defeasible Reasoning, and Air 
Pollution Monitoring. 
 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Data sharing in the Internet of Things (IoT) [1] in general 
and in the context of smart cities [2] in particular will only reach 
its full potential if data can be collected by multiple sources. 
One such example is that people are able to share their data 
related to different events by leveraging the sensing ca- 
pabilities of their smartphones. This crowd-sensing is a recent 
trend [3] and may soon outperform traditional data collection 
methods such as using pre-installed sensors. However, crowd- 
sensing may involve privacy issues for device owners. For ex- 
ample, some of the data collected by smartphones may contain 
sensitive information such as the location data of the owners. In 
the context of smart cities, the data may come from a variety of 
sources, such as institutional actors, equipment manufacturers, 
network operators, infrastructure providers, service providers, 
and end users [4]. These data potentially undergo several 
transformations, such as aggregation and composition, before 
reaching their final destination. Another important aspect is 
that the IoT data may also be shared for common usage through 
linked  data  sets  such  as  Linked Open  Data  [5].  Therefore 
successful, and in some cases meaningful data sharing in smart 
cities depends on the establishment of trusted relationships 
among participants. We believe that participants will share their 
data when they have the ability to control the use of their data. 
To deal with this issue of trust and control, we have proposed 
a data usage control model to capture the diversity of 
obligations and constraints that data owners impose on the use 
of data [4]. However, the architectural support to provide data  
usage  transparency and  accountability is  still  lacking, 
motivating  us  to  develop  this  type  of  architecture  support 
for stakeholders in the context of shared platforms in smart 
cities.  The  stakeholders  themselves  can  thus  participate  in 
the  sequence of  steps in  the  mechanism that enhances the 
transparency and accountability of data usage. 
 
We use the concept of ontologies and introduce the notion 
of trust ontology, a formal representation of concepts related to 
data usage control requirements, to annotate the data generated 
by the devices or resources in smart cities. We have a semantic 
data model with which to present the number of entities, the 
states of these entities. This leads to increased flexibility in 
terms of data integration, modeling, and processing compared 
to our previous data model based on NGSI [6]. This approach 
is also aligned with the standardization reported in OneM2M 
[7] as it provides the required abstractions. 
 
Moreover, we provide trust enforcement for shared data 
based on the consumers’ requests and policies of data owners, 
allowing the IoT shared platform to keep track of data usage 
history. We then experiment further on a specific use case, using 
a logic reasoner [8] to provide tests based on defeasible 
reasoning. Trust-based Data Usage (TDU) is the name of our 
solution. 
 
The main contributions of this paper are four-fold: (i)  A 
multi-layer architecture for TDU -  we describe a  use case 
scenario,  its  background  and  main  functional  entities.  We 
also include a semantic and abstraction discussion for data 
integration, modeling, and processing; (ii)  A mechanism to 
enhance the transparency and accountability of data usage - all 
the steps for stakeholders are provided; (iii)  A TDU Ontology 
(TDUO), created by extending some related concepts of the data 
usage conceptual model. We also define trust policies based on 
defeasible rules and perform trust enforcement; and (iv)  We 
implement a prototype as a use case based on the TDU 
architecture to evaluate its performance. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section 
II  presents a  motivating scenario to  illustrate the  need  for 
TDU. Section III presents our proposed system architecture in 
detail and Section IV discusses the semantics and abstraction. 
Section V presents the transparency and accountability mecha- 
nism. Section VI presents our prototype implementation along 
with the results. The related work is discussed in Section VII,
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Fig. 1: Motivating Scenario. 
 
and finally Section VIII concludes the paper by highlighting 
few lesson learned and some ideas for future work. 
 
 
II.    MOTIVATING SCENARIO 
 
In this section, we describe a use case scenario to illustrate 
the need for TDU. First to complete the proposed scenario 
in our previous work [4], it should be noted that without 
considering TDU, the end-user applications will not perform 
well, as it won’t be able to offer a better experience. 
 
Figure 1 shows the air pollution monitoring scenario use 
case in a smart city. 
 
There are multiple stakeholders, such as institutional actors, 
equipment manufacturers, network operators, infrastructure 
providers, service providers, and end users, which have a diver- 
sity of obligations and constraints in terms of controlling the 
use of their data. In the scope of this study, we cover four high- 
level descriptions of the data usage requirements:(i)  Spatio- 
temporal granularity; (ii)  Abstraction/masking of certain in- 
formation; and (iii)  the Conditions by class of actor/purpose. 
The main requirements are explained in the following use case 
scenario. 
 
1) The data owner (the company that deploys and owns 
the pollution monitoring sensors) will have full access to all 
the details generated by all the individual pollution monitoring 
sensors. 
 
2) For municipal authorities, the data owner is willing to 
make the average air pollution index per street available on an 
hourly basis. 
 
3) Only statistical data will be made available to commer- 
cial operators, over a specific zone and on a weekly basis. 
 
 
III.    SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 
This section presents the proposed system architecture, 
beginning with a description of our previous work on which 
we based our present solution. A detailed description of 
different layers and functional entities in the architecture is 
then presented. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Proposed TDU Architecture. 
 
A.  Background 
 
The proposed architecture is based on our previous works 
in [9], [10], and [4]. The architectures in [9] and [10] deal with 
the simultaneous acquisition of data by multiple applications 
and services from deployed sensors. These applications and 
services can be traditional as well as semantic-based Wire- 
less Sensor Network (WSN) applications. When required, the 
sensor data can be annotated using sensor domain ontology, 
such as the Semantic Sensor Network (SSN) [11]. However, 
all of this data is sent directly to the consumers (platform 
or end-user applications) without allowing the owners of the 
data to enforce certain policies concerning its usage. In other 
words, it is assumed that the data is always trusted, which may 
not be true. For example, issues such as how the same data 
can be shared among multiple end-users by using different 
policies based on their location, time or role (home users, city 
administration or law enforcement agency) are not addressed in 
the above-mentioned works. In addition, the two architectures 
mentioned above only consider WSNs as the source of data, 
whereas in the broader context of the IoT and smart cities, many 
types of devices, in addition to sensors, provide data to end-
users. In [4] we presented a step-by-step data handling 
mechanism for data owners, data consumers, and an IoT shared 
platform. These are our staring points for contributing to the 
architecture proposed in this study. 
 
B.  Layers and Functional Entities 
 
Figure 2 shows the architecture designed for the proposed 
trust-based data sharing model (TDU). It contains the follow- 
ing three layers: 
 
1) Infrastructure Layer:  This bottom layer contains a va- 
riety  of  IoT  objects  that  are  deployed  to  send  their  data 
to different applications. Because of the IoT scenario, we 
consider that these IoT objects can belong to different do- 
mains, such as smart sensors from the WSN domain, smart
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 street lights/traffic signal poles from smart cities domain, or 
home alarm systems/intelligent HVAC systems from a smart 
home/building domain. We also consider that some kind of 
infrastructure access/control mechanism is used by each of 
these domains independently. 
 
2) Platform Layer: The platform layer is the middle layer, 
and it consists of the following four functional entities, On- 
tology Manager (OM), Policy Manager (PM), Data Manager 
(DM), and Application Manager (AM). This contributes to the 
advancement of our previous architecture, in which the OM 
was used to work with the domain and trust ontologies. Here, 
the PM is used to work with trust policies, the DM is used to 
work with IoT data or resources from the infrastructure (INF), 
and the DM works with IoT applications. The interactions 
between these entities are discussed in Section (V-A). 
 
3) Application Layer: The last layer, the application layer, 
contains end-user applications (APP) that receives the shared 
data from the  infrastructure through the  platform. We  also 
consider that in most cases, the APP will receive and consume 
the sensor data (sent to it according to a pre-set policy) but 
also the data’s owner (OWN) (probably) wants to know the 
data’s usage. 
 
IV.    SEMANTIC AND ABSTRACTION 
 
This section presents the semantic technologies for data 
integration, modeling, and processing in order to apply this 
approach to the IoT data in the proposed TDU architecture. 
 
A.  Data integration 
 
In this study, we use semantic technologies to provide data 
consistency among heterogeneous data set schema. We propose 
the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [12] to encode the 
IoT data and resources. Note that the RDF allows for the easy 
integration of multiple vocabularies [13]. Our IoT data and 
resources are published as Linked Data [5]. 
 
B.  Data modeling 
 
We propose semantic language to model the number of 
entities and the state of those entities for IoT devices or re- 
sources. This makes it possible to interact with higher-level 
entities  rather  than  directly with  IoT  devices  or  resources. 
Currently, there are numerous efforts to provide ontologies 
for various domains. For example, for sensors we have an 
SSN ontology [11] that was developed and proposed at the W3C 
for standardization. Other ontologies include the Smart 
Appliance REFerence(SAREF) ontology developed by TNO1 , 
which covers popular sensors and actuators. Recently, Linked 
Open  Vocabularies for  the  Internet  of  Things  (LOV4IoT)2 
referenced to more than 300 existing ontology-based projects 
relevant for the IoT. Introducing abstraction based on a se- 
mantic approach is a concept being pushed forward within 
several standard defining organizations such as the ETSI M2M 
[14], OneM2M [7], and the W3C Web of Things3 . Therefore 
it is worthwhile reusing domain knowledge expertise from the 
existing ontologies in this architecture. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Transparency and Accountability Mechanism. 
 
C. Data processing 
 
We use Semantic web technologies to retrieve IoT data by 
means of SPARQL [15], an SQL-like language that enables 
querying an RDF store. It also allows logical reasoning, and so 
new information or knowledge can be inferred from existing 
assertions and rules. We can re-use existing reasoners (e.g. 
Pellet4 , Jena5 , or SPINDle [8]) for this purpose. 
 
V.    TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
This section presents the mechanism we developed to 
enhance the transparency and accountability of data usage and 
illustrate these aspects with sequence diagram. It also includes 
the trust ontology, trust policy, and reasoning with trust related 
policies. 
 
A.  Mechanism 
 
Figure 3 shows the sequence diagram of the mechanism to 
enhance transparency and accountability for data usage. The 
sequence here is aligned to the steps of the Figure 2 shown 
by the numbers in the arrows. 
 
The OM is used to manage the trust ontology mentioned 
in Section (III-B2 and V-B) to provide TDU. This type of 
ontology can be provided by the developer (DEV) at the 
platform. Next, trust policies from the data provider, presented 
in Section (III-B2 and V-C), are managed by the PM. In this 
study we assume that the owner of the data is the infrastructure 
owner (OWN). The policies can be obtained by the platform
                                                                                                             using a simple web-based form. For example, the data owner 
1 https://www.tno.nl
2 http://www.sensormeasurement.appspot.com/?p=ontologies 
3 http://www.w3.org/WoT/ 
4 https://github.com/complexible/pellet 
5 https://jena.apache.org/
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Fig. 4: The proposed Trust Data Usage Ontology (TDUO). 
can specify that the data from its infrastructure can be shared 
with industrial users but not with academic users. This process 
can also be used to specify granularities, such as to share data 
from location A with academic users and to share data from 
location B with industrial users only. Once the data usage policy 
is received, the PM creates and stores the trust policy based on 
the specific rules and the trust ontology. The data from  the  
INF  is  then  sent  to  the  DM  and  annotated with the metadata 
to control its usage and/or to make it more trustworthy. The PM 
extracts the specific rules from the related trust policy for the 
trust annotation process. 
 
Next, the APP sends a data usage query to the platform; 
the AM entity is responsible for processing the request. First, 
it checks for the trust proof with the PM that this query is 
provable or not. If the request is provable, the DM filters/pro- 
vides data according to the rules extracted from the policy 
to the AM. Next, the AM is tasked to keep track of the data 
usage history from the APP accessing the platform and to send 
them the final data. Using these steps, it is possible to have 
a TDU based on the owner-specified policies. The OWN also 
can request the platform to visualize data usage history, and 
process the data owner delegation to the APP. 
 
B.  Trust Ontology 
 
This subsection presents the trust ontology used to define 
the trust policy formulated in the next subsection. 
 
The proposed trust ontology is called TDUO which pro- 
vides more concepts related to the previously presented data 
usage conceptual model [4]. We define usage policy by using 
modal operators (Obligation, Forbidden, and Permission) on 
the following conditions: (i)  class of actors, (ii)  constraints 
(Spatiality, Temporality, and Abstraction), and (iii)  class of 
purposes. The proposed TDUO is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
1) Data Items:  A Data Item is an individual part of the 
Entity Element. The Entity Element is  a  container used to 
exchange information about an entity. It contains the following 
information: (i) an entity ID including the name and the type, 
(ii)  a list of the entity attributes, (iii)  (optionally) the name of 
an attribute domain that logically groups together a set of entity 
attributes, and (iv)  (optionally) a list of metadata that apply to 
all the attribute values of the given domain. We formally define 
a Data Item by using XML DTD, as mentioned in Listing 1. 
 
1    <!DOCTYPE  TDUO[ 
2    <!ELEMENT  DataItem(EntityElement)> 
3    <!ELEMENT  EntityElement(EntityID, 
AttributeDomainName?, EntityAttributeList, 
DomainMetadata?)> 
4    <!ELEMENT  EntityID(Id, Type)> 
 
5    <!ELEMENT  EntityAttributeList(EntityAttribute*)> 
6    <!ELEMENT  EntityAttribute(Name,  Type, 
EntitytValue, EntityMetadata+)> 
7    <!ELEMENT  DomainMetadata(EntityMetadata*)> 
8    <!ELEMENT  EntityMetadata(Name,  Type, Value)> 
9    ... 
10    ]> 
Listing 1: XML DTD Definition of Data Item. 
2) Conditions: The condition list contains (optionally) the 
following expressions: (i)  Temporal Constraints for temporal 
granularity, (ii) Spatial Constraints for spatial granularity, (iii) 
Abstraction Constraints for the masking of certain information, 
(iv)  Conditions by Actors, and (v)  Conditions by Purposes. 
We formally define conditions by using XML DTD, as shown 
in Listing 2. 
 
1    <!DOCTYPE  TDUO[ 
2    <!ELEMENT  Condition(Temporality*,  Spatiality*, 
Abstraction*,  Actor*,  Purpose*)> 
3    <!ELEMENT  Spatiality(SpatialScope*)> 
4    <!ELEMENT  Temporality(TemporalScope*)> 
5    <!ELEMENT  Abstraction(AbstractScope*)> 
6    <!ELEMENT  Actor(ActorScope*)> 
7    <!ELEMENT  Purpose(PurposeScope*)> 
8    <!ELEMENT  TemporalScope(Secondly?, Minutly?, 
Hourly?, Daily?,  Weekly?, Monthly?, Yearly?, 
Any?)> 
9    <!ELEMENT  SpatialScope(Street?, Zone?,  Any?)> 
10    <!ELEMENT  ActorScope(DataOwner?, 
MulnicipalAuthority?, ComercicalOperator?)> 
11    <!ELEMENT  AbstractScope(Aggregation?, Detail?, 
Any?)> 
12    <!ELEMENT  PurposeScope(CommercialUse?,  Any?)> 
13    ... 
14    ]> 
Listing 2: XML DTD Definition of Condition. 
3) Operators: This is a set of model operators (i) Obliga- 
tion (ii) Forbidden, and (iii)  Permission. The formal definition 
created using XML DTD is presented in Listing 3. 
 
1    <!DOCTYPE  TDUO[ 
2    <!ELEMENT  Operator(Obligation?,  Forbidden?, 
Permission?)> 
3    ... 
4    ]> 
Listing 3: XML DTD Definition of Operator. 
4) UsagePolicy: A collection of rules created by defining 
Operators on the individual Condition. Listing 4 formally 
defines the definition of Usage Policy using XML DTD. 
 
1    <!DOCTYPE  TDUO[ 
2    <!ELEMENT  UsagePolicy(Name,Rule*)> 
3    <!ELEMENT  Rule(Operator?,  Condition?)> 
4    <!ELEMENT  Name(URI?)> 
5    ... 
6    ]> 
Listing 4: XML DTD Definition of Usage Policy. 
 
C. Trust Policy 
 
The  trust  policy  is  used  by  the  stakeholders  to  define 
the diversity of obligations and constraints that they wish to 
impose on the usage of their data in the context of sharing by 
several smart cities actors. We consider that there are many 
possible  stakeholders’ policies  depending on  the  scenarios, 
sizes of cities, and infrastructures. Since multiple stakeholders 
each provide their trust policies, this may lead to inconsistent
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 and conflicting policies. To solve the conflicts that will arise 
between  rules  and  exceptions, we  have  applied  Defeasible 
Logic (DL) [16] to model the policy [4]. In this section, we 
describe in detail the trust policies related to our use case 
scenarios. 
 
Data  owners (DO):   have  full  access to  all  the  details. 
This policy is represented with the use of defeasible rules, 
as follows: 
 
RDO  = ¢r1,d : DO(X ) ിP  T emporalScope(X, any), 
r2,d : DO(X ) ിP  SpatialScope(X, any), 
r3,d : DO(X ) ിP  AbstractScope(X, any), 
r4,d : DO(X ) ിP  P urposeScope(X, any)¤G
 
Municipal authorities (M A): have permission to access the 
available average air pollution index (aggregation), e.g. per 
street on an hourly basis. This policy is represented with the 
use of defeasible rules, as follows: 
 
RM A  = ¢r1,m : M A(X ) ിP  SpatialScope(X, street), 
r2,m  : M A(X ) ിP  T emporalScope(X, hourly), 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Implemented Architecture of the Prototype.
r3,m : M A(X ) ിP  AbstractScope(X, aggregation)¤G A.  Implementation Consideration 
We  developed  an  air  pollution  monitoring  application
Commercial operators (C O): only statistical data will be 
made  available,  e.g.  over  a  zone  and  on  a  weekly  basis. 
This policy is represented with the use of defeasible rules, 
as follows: 
RC O  = ¢r1,c   : C O(X ) ിP  SpatialScope(X, zone), 
r2,c : C O(X ) ിP  T emporalScope(X, weekly), 
r3,c : C O(X ) ിP  AbstractScope(X, statistic)¤G
 
D. Trust Enforcement 
 
For example, we may have a consumer’s request that a 
commercial operator (C O) requests all the details of the air 
pollution index data over a street on an hourly basis. This 
request  is  represented with  the  use  of  defeasible rules,  as 
follows: 
 
r : C O(X ), [P ]SpatialScope(X, street), 
[P ]T emporalScope(X, hourly), 
[P ]AbstractionScope(X, detail) 
ിO  C onsumerRequest(X ) 
 
Reasoning    with    the    trust    policy,    we    come    to the           
conclusions:           ˰∆[O]C onsumerRequest(X ), 
˰∂[O]C onsumerRequest(X ).     This    means    that    this 
C onsumerRequest   is   not   defeasible   provable,   and   so 
the request is refused. If the consumer’s request is defeasible 
provable, the related data items will be filtered or aggregated 
following the request conditions before returning the results to 
the consumer. Every data usage transaction will be recorded 
as a new data item and later reported to the data owners. 
 
VI.    PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
 
To validate the proposed solution in this study, we imple- 
mented a prototype illustrating an air pollution monitoring use 
case and conducted some performance analysis. 
(APM) based on the scenario presented in Section II. It is 
offered as a RESTful web service based on Java Technology. 
The application was deployed in a cloud-based OPENSHIFT6 , 
which is a Platform as a Service (PaaS) that allows the 
development of SaaS applications without having to maintain 
a server. Figure 5 presents our implemented architecture for 
the prototype. 
 
1) Sensors: We simulated two composite sensor devices by 
using DPWS Simulator7 , and CoAP Simulator8 . These sensors 
are used to measure air pollution indexes such as temperature, 
humidity, CO2, and VOC (Volatile organic compound) data. 
 
2) Gateways:  We used Apache Tomcat9  to deploy a web 
application server for a gateway simulator. It received data 
from the sensors. 
 
3) OPDAM Platform: We used Apache Jena Framework10 , 
an open source Java Framework for developing semantic 
technology. We also used SPINdle [8], a logic reasoner that 
can  be  used  to  compute  the  consequence  of  DL  theories 
in an efficient manner. We built our shared platform, called 
OPDAM, including four main components: OM working with 
Air Pollution Domain Ontology and Trust Ontology; PM with 
Trust Policy/Rules; DM with sensor data, data annotation, and 
trust annotation; and DM with data enforcement and track data 
usage. 
 
4) APM  Application:  The  APM  is  a  RESTful  service 
developed using Restlet11 , a framework for developing REST 
web services. The service requests the relevant air pollution data 
from the OPDAM platform. 
 
6 https://www.openshift.com/ 
7 https://github.com/sonhan/dpwsim 
8 https://github.com/caohuuquyet/jhess/tree/master/jUCP 
9 http://tomcat.apache.org/ 
10 https://jena.apache.org/ 
11 http://restlet.com/
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Fig. 6: Trust Enforcement Time. 
 
B.  Prototype Setup 
 
We set up the prototype based on the architecture shown 
in Figure 5. First, we deployed two virtual sensors developed 
in Section (VI-A1). We also simulated sensors in different 
virtual areas to measure air pollution in those areas.  One 
sensor sent its data to the gateway simulator outlined in Section 
(VI-A2), and then the data was transferred to the platform by 
the gateway. Other sensors sent data directly to the platform. 
The OPDAM platform developed in Section (VI-A3) and the 
APM service developed in Section (VI-A4), are deployed on 
 
VII.    RELATED WORK 
 
Several research activities have investigated supporting for 
confidence related to data sharing in different domains, such 
as Web, Social Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, WSN, and 
IoT/Smart Cities. We categorized the different axes of 
confidence as  follows:  (i)  Traditional security  mechanisms 
(Access control, Authorization, Accountability [17], Privacy 
[18] [19]); (ii) Precision, Reliability and Trust Issues [20] [21]; 
(iii)   Abstraction and masking of information (for example, 
which level of information should be shared) [13]; (iv)  Data 
Licensing  [22];  and  (v)  Usage  control  (how  data  is  used 
after access to it has been granted [23]) and usage control 
mechanisms are well studied and continue to be improved [24]. 
In this study, we proposed a trusted data usage approach in the 
context of a shared platform in smart cities. We did not focus 
on security aspects such as confidentiality, access control, or 
privacy. In fact, we used the concept of usage control [23] as 
a starting point and then the data usage conceptual model [4] 
to propose our trust data usage concepts by defining the data 
usage requirements based on spatio-temporal granularity, the 
abstraction/masking of certain information and conditions by 
class of actors or purposes. We then focused our study on the 
architecture to ensure data usage transparency and account- 
ability. To the best of our knowledge, the ideas proposed in 
this study are novel and different from the previous efforts in 
the literature.
the cloud12 . 
VIII.    C 
 
ONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
 
C. Preliminary Performance Analysis 
 
This part mainly presents the results based on tests for the 
trust enforcement time (TET) in the implemented architecture. 
The goal is to show how much overhead is incurred due to the 
enforcement of data usage control based on the implementation 
configuration in Section VI-B. 
 
To evaluate the proposed solution, we performed two 
experiments and repeated each experiment 50 times.  Their 
confidence interval is 95%. In the first experiment, the server 
was restarted to create new server instance for each trust 
enforcement request. In the second experiment, we used the 
same instance of server for subsequent trust enforcement 
requests. Based on that, we measured the TET in delay seconds. 
Figure 
6 shows the results of each experiment (with and without new 
server instance respectively). 
 
If server is restarted (new server instance is created for each 
request) for each trust enforcement request we had average 
delay of over 253ms. If same instance of server is used for 
subsequent trust enforcement requests we have very less delay, 
the average time was around 20ms. In most cases we did not 
have large delay, hence trust enforcement does not incur much 
additional delay. 
 
We also tried to use a cloud-based Google App Engine 
(GAE) but encountered exceptions such as access control 
exception while invoking the SPINdle logic reasoner. Solving 
these exceptions involves deep understanding of GAE and 
improve other performance analysis aspects, this is our planned 
future work. 
 
Trust is the key for sharing IoT data among various 
stakeholders. Using  a  simple  scenario  for  smart  cities,  we 
propose a trust model to harmonize data sharing incorporating 
policies  defined by  the  data  owner.  In summary, we have 
contributed a novel multi-layer architecture for TDU including 
a use case scenario, its background, main functional entities, 
and semantic and abstraction models. The mechanism for 
transparency and accountability of data usage has provided 
as a sequence diagram to the smart cities’ stakeholders. This 
also has proposed a TDUO trust ontology, defined trust policies 
based on the trust ontology and defeasible rules, and performed 
trust enforcement using defeasible reasoning. We finally have 
implemented a prototype based on the TDU architecture to 
evaluate our solution. 
 
We learned several lessons from this study. The first is 
that multiple stakeholders have to be involved in defining 
data sharing policies. In simple scenarios, these are normally 
defined by the data producer. However, in the IoT, data is 
often merged from various sources and it becomes difficult to 
determine who owns which data. The second lesson concerns 
the trust ontologies. We found that some effort needs to be 
expended in defining general and more open trust ontology, 
a likely topic for future work. The third lesson is that the 
defining of trust and data usage policies should have input 
from multiple actors. How data from IoT devices in a private 
domain (e.g. smart homes) can be utilized and/or provided to 
interested entities needs to be explored. In some cases giving 
incentives, like tax rebates, will be useful.  
For  the  next  steps  in  this  work,  we  will  consider  its 
implementation and validation in the real environment using 
end-to-end interactions. Another future work item is the 
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development of an open source rule engine interpreter. This 
rule engine can be used on the cloud-based GAE with no 
encountered exceptions and improved performance aspects. 
Defeasible logic is a useful technique to check for inconsistent 
rules, but we need to explore if there are other solutions available 
for this purpose. Lastly, we are going to provide a visualization 
tool to help users to customize their policies in an interactive 
format that allows them to explore the consequences of certain 
changes. 
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